In 2003, the military intervention in Iraq by the United States and the United Kingdom demonstrated yet again the decisive extent to which military force effectiveness is dependent on superior intelligence and command capability. This has been true since time immemorial – Moses acknowledged as much when he sent scouts ahead to reconnoitre the Promised Land. Things have changed somewhat since Moses’ time: today, superior intelligence and command capability are a core constant of military planning for multinational operations. This is what this article is about.
„[…] The concept of “Network-Centric Warfare”, introduced in the United States towards the end of the 1990s, has since gained currency in European military planning. In essence and as the term implies, network-centric warfare provides for the permutation of intelligence, command systems and weaponry within the decision-making process to provide military and political commands with a virtually “real-time” situation assessment, thereby accelerating command procedures and substantively enhancing the effective commitment of resources […].“
Covert intelligence comes in different guises, namely a non-technical form commonly designated “human intelligence” (HUMINT) and two technical forms, “imagery intelligence” (IMINT) and “signals intelligence” (SIGINT). The most common method of gathering intelligence lies in the evaluation of open-access technical, scientific, political and economic data which are publicly available in hard copy or electronic format […].“
Faust, Dominik A.: Intelligence Superiority and Command Capability (together with J. Dietrich), in: Wogau, Karl von (Ed.): The Path to European Defence, Antwerpen/Apeldoorn 2004, S. 250-264 (ISBN: 90 6215 923 0).
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